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Supervised by Professor Usha Natarajan
ABSTRACT
In recent years, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula has joined an unfortunate category of what I call
‘Outlaw spaces’: spaces that are characterized and understood as being shaped by crisis,
chaos and collapse. Outlaw spaces –which include the “black holes,” the “breeding
grounds,” the “security vacuums” and the “no man’s lands” that have proliferated in the
post-9/11 era—are constructed through the interplay of both legal and imaginative
geographies. Mapping and labeling certain zones as lawless, chaotic and dangerous is
deceptive. There is nothing natural about Outlaw spaces and it is not always clear where
they begin and where they end. While Outlaw spaces are imagined as law-less, law may
still be present – even abundant – in the space but works in strategic ways and along
specific trajectories. Whether Outlaw spaces are dangerous, lawless, chaotic or not, the
drawing of boundaries and labeling of the spaces they demarcate amounts to a forceful
exercise of power and has important implications for the ways in which the space will be
regulated, not regulated or selectively regulated through law. Conceiving a space to be
outside the law not only creates truths about that space, it also seeks to provide an
explanation for the nature of these spaces and in doing so, asserts the opposite qualities of
in-law spaces that are constructed in their opposition. These processes of mapping,
zoning, dividing and labeling of space are not just a tool for the use or non-use of law
within a space, they also seek to provide a narrative for why the imperial eye of law has
failed in its efforts to infinitely extend its reach to sanction and transform the Other.
Rather than sanctioning, transforming or rebuilding Outlaw spaces, they may instead be
simply contained, controlled, exploited or ignored.
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I. Introduction
Vast areas of Egypt’s Sinai desert have descended into lawlessness in recent months,
providing fertile ground for small cells of extremist militants that have emerged from the
shadows and quietly established training camps near the Israeli border.1
Egypt's Sinai Peninsula […] is now drawing comparisons to the ungoverned tribal
regions of Pakistan as networks of Bedouin tribes, Sinai's criminal elements and radical
Islamists have begun to capitalize on Egypt's post-revolution security vacuum by
increasingly engaging in drug and arms smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism. The
escalating lawlessness in the Sinai risks turning the region into a powder keg.2
The Sinai is turning into a kind of Wild West...3
We drove down a bumpy dirt road a few kilometers from the Egypt-Gaza border close to
the Egyptian town of Sheikh Zuweid. We drove through olive, peach and almond
orchards and passed an occasional low-lying cement brick house with laundry lines
fluttering, goats and children looking to see who was coming down the road. Around the
next bend in the road, a very different sight came into view. Perched at the top of a hill
was a three-story condominium-style house with a brick red Chinese pagoda roof. A
vertical pane of metallic blue windows reflected the North Sinai sun back into our eyes as
we passed. “That’s the house of a trafficker,” the North Sinai Bedouin man who rode
with me in the car told me. When I asked whether these were arms traffickers or human
traffickers, he responded, “Some of them traffic weapons, some of them traffic Africans.
I don’t know which one they do, but everyone knows who is making money around
here.” Other pagoda style roofs could be seen on the skyline across Egypt’s eastern
border region, a trend for those who have recently come into money from lucrative crossborder trade.
“Trafficking in Africans,” as it is often called in North Sinai, is in reference to a
phenomenon that has emerged in recent years in which sub-Saharan African migrants and
asylum-seekers en route to Israel via Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula are kidnapped by their
1

Ernesto Londoño, In Egypt’s Sinai Desert, Islamic Militants Gaining New Foothold, WASHINGTON POST,
(July 13, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-13/world/35488579_1_islamicmilitants-north-sinai-israeli-forces.
2
Mark Udall, Sinai Chaos Threatens Egypt-Israel Security, CNN, (July 12, 2012), available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/12/opinion/udall-sinai.
3
Ori Lewis, Egypt’s Sinai Turning into Wild West: Israeli PM, REUTERS, (April 24, 2012), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/24/us-israel-egypt-sinai-idUSBRE83N0EP20120424.

would-be smugglers who demand increasingly exorbitant ransoms for their release.4 The
kidnappers use torture, rape and organ extraction to coerce relatives of their victims –
primarily Eritreans fleeing their country’s military dictatorship - to pay the demanded
ransom.5 In a twist to the smuggling-turned-trafficking narrative,6 many individuals who
have been swept into the vast trafficking network whose branches reach into Sudan,
Eritrea and Ethiopia never intended to migrate in the first place, but were kidnapped from
their homeland or from a refugee camp in northeastern Sudan and brought to the Sinai.7
It is here, in the borderlands surrounding the towns of Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid, that
many of them are held while their families try to furnish the funds to secure their release.
Even for those migrants whose smugglers merely provide transportation and assistance
for an agreed upon fee, the journey across the Sinai to Israel may prove lethal. The
shoot-to-stop policy enacted by Egyptian border guards against those crossing into Israel
has turned the border into a kill-zone.8
4

As of summer 2012, ransoms are reported to have reached as high as $50,000 USD per person.
See MIRJAM VAN REISEN, MERON ESTEFANOS AND CONNY RIJKEN, HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE SINAI:
REFUGEES BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH 30 (September 26, 2012) http://www.eepa.be/wcm/humanrights/3177-human-trafficking-in-the-sinai-refugees-between-life-and-death.html.
5
Id. at 12, 21, 38-41. See also Fred Pleitgen, Refugees Face Organ Theft in the Sinai, CNN, (November 3,
2011), available at http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/03/refugees-face-organ-theft-inthe-sinai/ Gianluca Mezzofiore, Eritrea’s Forgotten Refugess: Kidnapped, Tortured, Ransomed and Killed
in
Sinai,
INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
TIMES,
(April
9,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/455019/20130409/eritrean-sinai-refugees-egypt-sudan.htm.
6
One possible legal analysis of the situation faced by migrants in the Sinai is that while their journey
begins as what would be defined as human smuggling, when the initial ‘business agreement’ is broken and
exploitation in the form of kidnapping, extortion, torture, rape or organ extraction enter the picture, the
situation may instead be defined as human trafficking. Other analyses would argue that what is happening
in the Sinai does not qualify as human trafficking and would still be defined as human smuggling.
Theoretically, someone who fits the definition of a victim of trafficking contained in the Trafficking
Protocol and the 2010 Egyptian legislation written to implement the law at the domestic level would
receive additional protections and support from the state. In reality, however, the Egyptian Anti-trafficking
law has only been applied to a select number of cases related to domestic workers in urban areas and to
child brides trafficked out of Egypt. See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and
Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention (15 November 2000), A/RES/55/25, Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (15 November
2000), A/RES/55/25, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I)
(2001), entered into force Dec.25, 2003.
7
RACHEL HUMPHRIS, REFUGEES AND THE RASHAIDA: HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING FROM
ERITREA TO SUDAN AND EGYPT (November 2012) http://www.unhcr.org/51407fc69.html.
8
See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Sinai Perils: Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in
Egypt and Israel, (2008) http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/11/12/sinai-perils-0; REBECCA FURST-NICHOLS
AND KAREN JACOBSEN, AFRICAN MIGRATION TO ISRAEL: DEBT, EMPLOYMENT AND REMITTANCES
(September
2011)
https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/42011548/migrationisrael.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1297104037000.
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A few kilometers after passing the pagoda-roofed house we arrived at our destination,
a nice but modest house just off the dirt road overlooking a large olive grove. It was the
home of a Bedouin sheikh who offers refuge to individuals who have escaped from their
kidnappers or who have been released by their captors after their families were able to
provide the ransom demanded. The sheikh told us that a group of fourteen Eritreans had
just left his house earlier that week, making their way back to Cairo where they would
either apply for asylum or continue their journey elsewhere. He pointed out a large room
with pillows, blankets and cushions where the Eritreans had stayed. This was no
underground hideout or secret back room and had big open-air windows looking out over
the hills, just meters from the main road. As we sat drinking tea in the courtyard outside I
asked the sheikh, who is known in the community for the assistance he provides, if the
traffickers had ever confronted him for his work or if they had ever come to his house to
retrieve their “goods.” “No,” he responded without hesitation, “this would never happen.
Anyone who sleeps in my house is my guest. According to Bedouin urfi law they cannot
cross onto my land or enter my house or harm my guests. They would never dare.”
***
I came to this thesis through an interest in this story, in the human trafficking and
smuggling of sub-Saharan African migrants through the Sinai. In 2011, I was working
for a Cairo-based organization providing legal assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers
in Egypt and many of my clients had friends or relatives who had been kidnapped at
some point along the route to Israel.9 In the months that followed the withdrawal of
Egyptian security forces from the Sinai in February 2011, the story of kidnapping and
trafficking in the Peninsula received considerable attention from international media and
human rights organizations.10 Articles, exposés and documentaries told of unbridled

9

Many recognized refugees living in Cairo decide to continue on to Israel due to the difficult economic
situation in Egypt. Egypt is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention but which has made a reservation to the
Article 17 allowing recognized refugees to engage in wage-earning employment in their country of asylum.
Additionally, the security situation in Cairo during the 2011 uprising and the months that followed was
particularly difficult for refugees and asylum seekers, many of whom lack identification or whose UNHCR
cards were not recognized by the police and military personnel manning the large number of checkpoints
around the city at that time. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art 17, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
entered into force April 22, 1954.
10
Some human rights organizations have been following the plight of migrants in the Sinai since 2008.
See, for example, Sinai Perils supra note 8, Amnesty International, Egypt Deadly Journeys through the
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criminal networks, torture, rape and death with the occasional story of rescue or escape.11
Some of the reports, which continue to be published today albeit with less frequency,
lament the Egyptian government’s inaction in stopping the traffickers, but acknowledge
the limitations placed on the military and security forces under the 1979 Peace Treaty
with Israel. A typical human rights report on the subject echoes the story told by the
international media, describing the plight of those held by traffickers, their reasons for
travel and their horrific experiences in the Sinai.12 The authors then go on to outline the
extensive legal framework13 applicable to the problem, to criticize the Egyptian
Desert, (2008) http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/MDE12/015/2008/en/3254d528-6ae8-11dd-8e5e43ea85d15a69/mde120152008en.pdf.
11
See for example Phoebe Greenwood, Egyptian authorities look the other way as Bedouin kidnap
refugees,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(February
14
2012),
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/14/egypt-bedouin-kidnap-refugees-israel; Emily Alpert, African
refugees kidnapped, brutalized in Sinai, report says, LA TIMES, (April 3, 2013), available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-eritrean-refugees-brutalized20130403,0,6113119.story; Jerome Taylor, Forgotten: The Stolen People of the Sinai, THE INDEPENDENT,
(January 20, 2012), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/forgotten-the-stolenpeople-of-the-sinai-6292201.html; Fred Pleitgen and Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Bedouin Successes Fighting
People
Traffickers,
CNN,
(September
19,
2012),
available
at
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/category/death-in-the-desert/; Sarah Lynch, Sinai Becomes
Prison
for
African
Migrants,
NY
TIMES,
(October
31,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/world/middleeast/01iht-m01-sinaimigrants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
12
See for example Sinai Perils supra note 8, Human Rights Watch, Egypt: End Sinai Nightmare for
Migrants, 05 September 2012, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/05/egypt-end-sinainightmare-migrants, Human Rights Watch, Egypt: End Traffickers’ Abuse of Migrants, 09 December 2010,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/09/egypt-end-traffickers-abuse-migrants,
Amnesty
International,
Egypt:
Deadly
Journeys
Through
the
Desert,
2008,
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/MDE12/015/2008/en/3254d528-6ae8-11dd-8e5e43ea85d15a69/mde120152008en.pdf, Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Hostages, Torture, and Rape in the
Desert: Findings from 284 Asylum Seekers about Atrocities in the Sinai’ 2011,
http://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/Phr-israel-Sinai-Report-English-23.2.2011.pdf.
13
The content of the suggested legal framework varies by report but may include Egypt’s “detailed and
strong” anti-trafficking law, Arab Republic of Egypt People’s Assembly Law No. 64 of 2010 regarding
Combatting Human Trafficking, as well as international instruments such as the Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air supra note 6; the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children supra note 6; the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees supra note 9; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984),
entered into force June 26, 1987; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9520, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, entered into force June 20, 1974. Beyond this exhaustive list, one
report contains a section entitled Application of the Legal Framework in which the writer goes through a
series of legal acrobatics to fit the situation in the Sinai into distinct profiles with applicable international
norms. One such profile is “Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Debt Bondage and Forced Begging”
in which the author makes a rather convoluted argument that the practice of forcing refugees held hostage
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government for not upholding their legal obligations under the treaties and protocol in
question, and to encourage them to take the legal measures necessary to address the
problem.14
This story, however, is only part of a larger narrative within media and human rights
reports in recent years, one that frames the injustices occurring in the Sinai as the human
toll of a larger context of lawlessness and chaos in the Peninsula following the uprising
that toppled President Mubarak in early 2011. The kidnapping and trafficking of
migrants emerges alongside reports of a host of other illicit and dangerous activities in
the Peninsula: gunmen attack checkpoints and police stations, militants bomb the gas
pipeline that runs through the Peninsula, heavy weapons and explosives exit Egypt
through tunnels under the eastern border and Islamic militants enter the country through
the same tunnels. The Sinai has been described in some news reports as a potential
breeding ground for militant Islam, a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and global terrorism and
even a new Wild West.15 In light of these dynamics, some have declared the current
situation on the Peninsula to be a security vacuum that could threaten regional peace.16
Reading these reports on the Sinai, one cannot help but notice the ways in which they
echo descriptions of a number of other spaces around the globe, in what seems to have
become a global narrative of ungovernable spaces of lawlessness and chaos. Following
the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 9/11 Commission released an expansive list of
“terrorist sanctuaries” that included spaces of many scales: regions of countries, countries
themselves, entire regions of the globe and even “European cities with expatriate Muslim
communities.”17 In the years that have followed, this sort of spatial reordering has
in the Sinai to call their relatives for ransom money qualifies as forced begging, which “has been explicitly
included in the trafficking definition in some countries and has now been adopted as a possible form of
exploitation in the EU Trafficking Directive (2011/36), thereby extending the trafficking definition.”
Refugees between Life and Death supra note 4 at 57-61.
14
See, e.g., Refugees between Life and Death supra note 4; Deadly Journeys supra note 12; Hostages,
Torture and Rape supra note 12.
15
Lewis supra note 1; Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Egypt’s Wild West, FOREIGN POLICY, (August 24, 2011),
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/24/egypts_wild_west.
16
See, e.g. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Sinai: From Absence of State to Political Pawn,
(August 14, 2012) http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/d9de757f-5b99-4dcd-82c7-74a6b2595f33# (last
visited
February 15, 2013); NICOLAS PELHAM, SINAI: THE BUFFER ERODES (September 2012)
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0912pelham.pdf.
17

The report lists the following spaces as terrorist sanctuaries: the Afghanistan border region; southern or
western Afghanistan; the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the nearby Horn of
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produced Rogue States, the Axis of Evil, and “breeding grounds” of all scales that left
un-addressed threaten to generate terror. International headlines tell us that Libya’s south
teeters towards chaos,18 Mali’s north breeds terror,19 Guantanamo is a legal black hole,20
and Waziristan is a no man’s land.21 Failed states, failed cities and failed neighborhoods
proliferate as we learn of yet more spaces of lawlessness: Rio slums are ruled by drug
gangs and militias, neighborhoods in Lagos exist outside state control and post-Hurricane
Katrina New Orleans descended into disorder. In recent years, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula
has been shuffled into this ill-fated category of spaces shaped by crisis, chaos and
collapse in which the “hundreds of bodies”22 of Eritrean migrants reported in the media
can only be seen as an unfortunate human toll in an void of uncaused lawlessness and
violence.
This spatial imagination of the Sinai prevents us from seeing and understanding
certain aspects of what is happening on the Peninsula. By viewing the Sinai as
ungovernable, we fail to see the selective and strategic ways that the Egyptian state
intervenes in the space. The characterization of the Sinai as lawless precludes us from
seeing that there is, in fact, an abundance of law in the Peninsula and that the exceptional
regulation of the Sinai through domestic and international law has contributed to the
construction of the Peninsula as a space that is outside and Other to Egypt’s center. By
seeing the space as a chaotic security vacuum, we miss the opportunity to see and to
challenge the economic and political structures of power at work in the Sinai. This thesis
seeks to disrupt the narrative of the Sinai that has emerged since the uprisings that
toppled President Mubarak in 2011 and to shed light on the relationships of power in the
Africa, including Somalia and extending southwest into Kenya; Southeast Asia, from Thailand to the
southern Philippines to Indonesia; West Africa, including Nigeria and Mali; and European cities with
expatriate Muslim communities.” THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 366-367 (November 27, 2002) www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
18
Jeffrey Fleishman, Libya’s south teeters toward chaos, LA TIMES, (March 30, 3013), available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-libya-dangerous20130331,0,4597838.story.
19
John Price, Northern Mali a breeding ground for terrorists long before the current crisis, WASHINGTON
TIMES, (February 20, 2013), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/20/northernmali-a-breeding-ground-for-terrorists-lon/?page=all.
20
Anthony Mason, Guantanamo: Legal Black Hole, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (November 30, 2010)
available at http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/comments/24286/.
21
Daud Khattak, No Man’s Land, PRAGUE POST, (March 20, 2013), available at
http://www.praguepost.com/news/15747-no-mans-land.html.
22
Mike Thompson, Sinai torture for Eritreans kidnapped by traffickers, BBC NEWS, (March 6, 2013),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21670929.
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Peninsula in ways that may provide a better understanding not just of the Peninsula, but
of the other no man’s lands, black holes and breeding grounds around the globe that
regularly appear in the international news.
While the notion of the Sinai as a troubled space has received intense attention in
recent years, a history of war and occupation on the Peninsula have meant that the Sinai
has simultaneously embodied and absorbed many of the long-standing tensions between
Egypt and Israel and in the larger region. This thesis explores the ways in which the
Sinai and its population have been simultaneously included and excluded from Egypt
along particular political, legal and economic lines. I propose that the relationship
between Egypt and the Sinai has rendered the Peninsula as a space that is different from
the rest of Egypt, a part of—yet somehow outside of –Egyptian territory, an Other-space
to Egypt’s center.
The perceived Otherness of the Sinai has often animated and justified efforts by the
Egyptian government to domesticate and transform the space through law, though these
efforts often appear to be partial and incomplete. In this thesis, I argue that the Sinai has
been constructed not just as an Other-space, but as an Outlaw space whose dangerous and
threatening nature both justifies and requires measures that call not only for sanctioning
and transforming the space, but also for containing, controlling and even ignoring it. I
further propose that this dynamic is not unique to the Sinai but is indicative of a
contemporary moment in the relationship between law and space that operates on many
scales. The construction of spaces as lawless and chaotic, I propose, serves specific
purposes in relation to the strategic use of law. Outlaw spaces reinforce the
characteristics of spaces constructed in their opposition, they justify the exceptional
behavior of the state within those spaces and they allow for certain strategic and selective
uses of law in the space to the exclusion of others, facilitating the active
underdevelopment of those spaces as natural resources and profits are funneled out and
further distracting from the resulting poverty and marginalization within those spaces.
Chapter II of this thesis considers the relationship between Egypt and the Sinai and
the ways in which the two spaces have been co-constructed as a modern nation-state and
as a frontier zone. Chapter III examines the various legal geographies of the Sinai
through the lens of the relationship between international law and the Other. Chapter IV
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explores the role of imaginative geographies in the processes of mapping, zoning,
dividing and constructing space as Outside and Outlaw. Chapter V concludes by briefly
exploring the implications for not only the Sinai, but also spaces beyond the Sinai such as
the black holes, the breeding grounds and the no man’s lands that have proliferated in the
post-9/11 era.

8

II. Egypt and the Sinai: The Making of a Nation-State, the Construction of a
Frontier Zone
The relationship between the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian State is one that has long
been characterized by the state’s efforts to exert control over its population, resources,
territory and borders in the Peninsula. But it is equally characterized by the tendency of
the Sinai – its population, territory and eastern borders—to resist, defy or evade this
domestication. From the early stages of modern state formation starting with the rule of
Mehmet Ali Pasha in 1805 to the period following the resignation of President Mubarak
in 2011, this relationship has been contested and renegotiated according to economic and
strategic necessities.
In this Chapter, I examine the ways in which the machinery of the modern Egyptian
nation-state has been used in attempts to domesticate the population, territory, and
resources of the Sinai and the role that law has played in these processes. While this
domestication has been crucial to shaping the relationship between the Peninsula and the
Egyptian state it has also been selective, partial and incomplete. Interventions in the
Sinai are focused on securing the state’s strategic and economic interests but have never
strived for full integration into Egypt. While a comprehensive history of the relationship
between the Sinai and the Egyptian State is beyond the scope of this thesis, this Chapter
elucidates the role of the Peninsula in the construction of the modern Egyptian nationstate and the simultaneous production of the Peninsula as a frontier zone.
A. Of Citizens and Territory: Producing the Modern Egyptian Nation-State
Having come into power in what was a highly globalized world with several empires
competing for domination, Mehmet Ali Pasha had to carefully strategize in order to assert
himself as the sole ruler of Egypt. By 1805, the Pasha had successfully transformed
himself from the governor of an Ottoman province to the sole ruler of Egypt and made
significant efforts to build a centralized state and assert Egypt’s autonomy from the
Ottoman Empire. Crucial in this process of modern state-formation at the time was the
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ability of the government to define its borders23 and to demonstrate full control over its
population and resources.
Mehmet Ali’s government made rigorous efforts to expand and solidify its rule
over Egypt. To achieve this, it “employed every possible means in order to penetrate the
public, external and institutional spheres, and to permeate the consciousness of as many
social groups as possible.”24 This meant strengthening military, judicial and bureaucratic
institutions, increasing government reach into urban spaces such as markets and mosques
and extending the government’s reach into the rural areas and the desert peripheries of
the country.25 Mehmet Ali sought to settle the tribes in his newly established territory
whose leaders represented centers of power and whose population was seen to be
problematic, unpredictable and a threat to the stability of central rule.26 The state sought
to shift loyalties from tribe to the state to better control the population, but also to help
protect against enemy threats that could endanger the Pasha’s newly established rule.
Also at stake was the government’s ability to implement ambitious agrarian and
economic reforms and to ensure the security and free operation of trade routes, the
economic lifelines of the country.
While they represented a minority of the total tribal population in Egypt at the
time27 those in the desert periphery and border regions presented additional challenges to
the regime and were often regarded with suspicion and fear. The Bedouin tribes of the
Sinai were of particular concern to the Pasha as their presence in the eastern frontier zone
gave them the power to disrupt important trade routes to Asia and to open Egypt to

23

The official location Egypt’s northeastern frontier during various phases of Mehmet Ali’s rule is debated
but the tribes of the Sinai acknowledged Mehmet Ali’s authority form the beginning of his rule and were
punished when they disobeyed him. See Yitzak Gil-Har, Egypt’s North-Eastern Boundary in Sinai, 29
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24
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Id.
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27
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potential invaders.28 At the same time, the Pasha saw Sinai Bedouins as valuable allies
who could assist him in his plans to expand his rule to territories further east.29
The relationship between Mehmet Ali’s government and Sinai tribes was
characterized by co-existence through both conflict and cooperation. The government
recognized the power of rebellious tribes to disrupt government activities, assist enemy
regimes and threaten security of trade and transportation. By adopting an administrative
policy that provided economic and political incentives to those who would cooperate,
Mehmet Ali was able to develop mutually beneficial relationships with tribal members
who in turn assisted him in military, economic and administrative efforts.30 Members of
the tribal elite then used this relationship to increase their own power and influence as the
regime became more dependent on their cooperation. The state’s bureaucratic machinery
thus produced citizens in the Sinai that were within the reach and control of the central
government in Cairo, but whose relative independence and resistance to full
domestication meant that they could never fully be brought within the realm of the law.
This period set an important precedent in the relationship between the Sinai and the
Egyptian state. Mehmet Ali’s government went to great lengths to assert the fixed
territoriality of the Egyptian nation-state but the Sinai, long a corridor of migration for
tribes, traders and migrants, seems to have defied these efforts. Hundreds of years later,
cross-border familial, tribal, economic, linguistic and political links have remained strong
and hundreds of underground tunnels crisscross Egypt’s eastern border bringing people,
goods and weapons to and from the Sinai. The machinery of the Mehmet Ali regime
extended its reach to the Sinai and made rigorous efforts at shifting loyalties from the
tribe to the state in order to produce citizens whose relationship to the state could be
regulated through law. The Pasha established elaborate administrative bureaucracies to
28

Id. at 5, 31, 102.
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of a centralized administrative bureaucracy. The Pasha appointed special officials, generally from among
the Ottoman-Egyptian elite of his regime, to manage tribal affairs within a given province or tribe. These
officials carried out the edicts and directives of the central regime and generally dealt with tribal affairs,
assisting the Pasha in carrying out punishments and sanctions when necessary. Id. at 163, 168.
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facilitate this relationship but it was ultimately the tribes in the Sinai who were able, in
many ways, to determine their relationship to the state using their peripheral location and
ability to disrupt trade routes as leverage. Today, the lack of government control in the
Sinai and the continued, and some would argue increasing,31 operation of tribal courts in
the Sinai has marked its population as still not fully domesticated by the law that rules the
rest of the country.
The geographic location of the Sinai directly affected its relationship to Mehmet
Ali’s central government, whose efforts to establish and assert its identity as a modern
nation-state required that it demonstrate control over its territory, population, resources
and borders. The geostrategic and economic importance of the Sinai has only increased
in the period following Mehmet Ali’s rule, and the residents of the Sinai have retained the
power to exert significant political and economic pressure on the central government.
B. A Buffer, a Highway, an Oil Field and a Beach Paradise: The Economic Stakes of
the Sinai
The economic value of the Sinai would only increase with the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869, with the subsequent discovery of oil, natural gas and mineral deposits in the
century that followed and again with the development of the Peninsula’s Red Sea coast
for tourism in the 1990s. As a territory, the Peninsula has been spatially valuable in
several ways: as a corridor or “highway” through which goods and resources can pass, as
a territorial buffer to the Suez Canal at its western edge, and as a site of immense profits
from both natural resource extraction and tourism.
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The construction of the Suez Canal at the geographic junction between the Sinai
and the African continent, connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, was of
strategic concern not only to Egypt, but also to European imperial powers. The Canal
provided European powers with a direct maritime connection to their colonies and
dramatically shortened the time needed to move goods and natural resources from the
colonies to Europe. Despite the fact that it was built by the forced labor of thousands of
Egyptian peasants,32 the Canal was heralded by some as a symbol of progress that would
“open up the East to the commerce and civilization of the West”;33 indeed, its
construction changed the face of global trade and of global politics. But the day the Suez
Canal opened would forever change Egypt’s relationship with the Sinai and with the rest
of the world. For whoever held the helm of power in Cairo, the Sinai remained a crucial
and strategic piece of land. Egypt’s leaders hoped that the construction of the Canal on
Egyptian territory would propel them into the exclusive club of “modern nations.”34 Just
as Mehmet Ali had looked to global powers during his reign as models of what it meant
to be an independent and modern state, his son Said Basha hoped to follow the lead of
European imperial powers and gain prominence by making full use of Egypt’s valuable
natural resources and playing an active part in the global economy. In this way, Said
Basha hoped and expected that the Suez Canal would lead Europeans to finally recognize
his country as a genuinely modern state.35
This hope was not realized; through his attempts to “purchase a better future for
Egypt using European loans”36 Said Basha drove Egypt into significant debt to fund the
project at Suez. This debt would ultimately justify decades of British imperial rule in the
32
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country and facilitate the movement of canal profits out of Egypt to European
shareholders.37 It was not until 1952 when Gamal ‘Abd el Nasser nationalized the Suez
Canal Company that the Canal and its profits fully belonged to Egypt.38 This placed the
Canal at the center of the national consciousness making it a symbol of political and
economic independence. While the Suez Canal is comparatively less crucial to today’s
world economy it remains an important source of income for Egypt.39 The Canal
continues to bring in billions of dollars of much needed annual revenue and, in light of
the Egypt’s faltering economy and the sharp decrease in revenues from tourism since
2011, the uninterrupted operation of the Canal remains a top priority for the Egyptian
government.40
As discussed above, since the inception of the modern Egyptian nation-state, the
Sinai has represented a strategic stake in light of the important trade routes that cross the
Peninsula and connect the economies of Africa with those of Asia. While the sort of
caravan trade-by-land of previous eras is no longer a part of regional trade, the Sinai
retains its economic value as a corridor through which Egypt transports natural gas to its
neighbors. The Egypt Gas Pipeline and its extension, the Arab Gas Pipeline, were
constructed under the Mubarak regime and allow Egypt to export natural gas to Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria and, formerly, Israel.41 Natural gas has been a major earner of foreign
37
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exchange for Egypt in recent decades, an income that depends on the uninterrupted flow
of gas out of the country. Like the trade routes of earlier times, the pipeline has proven
vulnerable to attack as it passes through the Sinai, increasing the importance of
government control of the region to secure its operation.42
In addition to its economic value as a buffer and as a corridor, the Sinai Peninsula
itself has become an important site of oil, natural gas and mineral extraction and, as I will
discuss in the following section, coastal tourism. As of 2012, Egypt was the fifth largest
oil producer on the African continent and a significant portion of the country’s oil
reserves are located in the Gulf of Suez and in the Sinai itself.43 The majority of Egypt’s
coal reserves are found in North Sinai and mined by both Egyptian and foreign
corporations. The Sinai has become a region that the Egyptian state relies upon in order
to provide natural resources for domestic consumption by its booming population and for
lucrative export. The significant reserves of oil, natural gas and minerals in the Sinai,
along with its coastal tourist destinations, have rendered it one of the most economically
important regions of Egypt, territory that must be strategically domesticated and
controlled, and whose instability could mean significant economic damage to the country.
C. A Problematic Integration: The Sinai after the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
With the creation of Israel in 1948, Egypt’s eastern border in the Sinai became a site of
increased tension and would come to be a theater of the Arab-Israeli wars in the decades
that followed. Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 War with Israel and the fifteen-year Israeli
market. Yolande Knell, Egypt Scraps Israel Gas Supply Deal, BBC NEWS, (April 23, 2012), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17808954; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Egypt: Q&A on the
Trial of Hosni Mubarak, (28 May 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/28/egypt-qa-trialhosni-mubarak; Hamza Hendawi, Life Sentence for Egypt’s Mubarak; Sons Acquitted, THE GUARDIAN,
(June 3, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10270577.
42
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occupation of the Sinai that followed confirmed the strategic stake the Peninsula
represented, not just to Egypt, but to the region and world.44 Egypt attempted to force
Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in the 1969 War of Attrition but failed in what proved
to be an enormous embarrassment for President Nasser and for Egypt. Egypt made
another attempt at reclaiming the Peninsula in 1973 during the October War,45 which
ended with a mutually agreed-upon cease-fire in 1975. The Sinai was at the center of
negotiations that followed, culminating in the US brokered 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty. Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai, returning
the Sinai to Egyptian control46 in what was celebrated as a victory for both Egypt and for
other Arab countries in the region.
After regaining the Peninsula, Egypt once again sought to determine its national
boundaries and to re-assert its place as a modern nation-state .47 Officially back in
Egyptian hands, the Sinai became “an issue of reconquest and national affirmation.”48
The development plans for the Peninsula that followed were a means by which the
Egyptian government could emphasize the value of the Sinai to the Egyptian public and,
in doing so, justify the costs of the military effort to retake it.49 The Sinai was still of
great geostrategic concern to President Hosni Mubarak, who came to power in 1981, but
his government was unable to freely exercise its military control over the Sinai due to
restrictions contained in the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel signed by his predecessor
President Anwar Sadat.50 Nonetheless, the Mubarak regime sought to reaffirm its
political and economic control over the Peninsula by establishing connections with
businesspeople and tribal sheikhs and by expanding the presence of the ruling National
Democratic Party in the Sinai.
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In the period that followed the return of the Sinai to Egypt, the Egyptian
government was tasked with re-sorting, re-ordering and re-affirming the loyalties of the
population of the Sinai, a population that had been under enemy occupation for fifteen
years and who were seen with even more suspicion and mistrust than before. The
loyalties of the population of the Sinai would continue to be brought into question in the
decades that followed. A 2010 court case, for example, urged the Egyptian government
to strip the citizenship of Egyptian men married to Israeli women.51 Given the legacy of
Israeli occupation in the Sinai and the cross-border relationships between Bedouins and
Egyptians of Palestinian descent, a large number of the estimated 30,000 Egyptian men
wed to Israeli women at the time were likely to be Sinai residents.
Today, the exoticized Bedouin nomad of the colonial imagination has little
resemblance to the population currently living in the Sinai. “Bedouin,” as Donald Cole
has pointed out, “has changed from denoting a way of life in the past to marking an
identity today.”52 That identity remains important for Sinai Bedouins who belong to
fifteen major tribes that are further divided by family.53 Bedouins tend to see their origins
as separate and distinct from Egyptians west of the Peninsula and refer to non-Bedouins
as “Egyptians.” The Egyptian national census contains no specific “Bedouin” category54
—and therefore there is no “official” population to be counted—but many of the policies
and politics of the Egyptian government in the Peninsula have been shaped and
influenced by the Bedouin category.
It should be noted that the Sinai Bedouin are not the only inhabitants of the
Peninsula. Many Palestinians live in the northern border towns and it is estimated that
one third of the population of the northern city of el Arish is of Palestinian descent.55
Additionally, a large number of Egyptians from the Nile Valley now live in the Sinai, as a
result of ambitious population settlement initiatives following the return of the Peninsula
from Israeli occupation. The National Project for the Development of Sinai, initiated in
51
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1994, sought to settle 3.2 million Nile Valley Egyptians in the Sinai and to create 800,000
jobs to employ them by 2017.56 These settlement projects, which coincided with massive
investment in the tourism industry in the Sinai, focused on the resort city of Sharm elSheikh and other sites along the Red Sea Coast. The jobs created from the development
project were primarily given to Nile Valley migrants to the exclusion of Sinai Bedouins,
many of whom lost their land and livelihoods as a result of these development
initiatives.57
As the Mubarak regime turned its attention to the Peninsula’s potential as a
profitable tourist destination in the 1990s, the Red Sea Coastal areas of South Sinai saw a
massive increase in domestic and international investments in the tourism industry and
the Sinai experienced a 16-fold jump in the percentage of Egypt’s total tourist
accommodations.58 The boom in the tourism industry, however, largely benefitted
Egyptian and foreign companies. It provided employment opportunities for workers
brought in from the Nile Valley while pushing Sinai locals to the economic margins of
employment and land ownership.59 In North Sinai, where the majority of the Sinai’s
population resides, “national development plans for the region have remained wishful
thinking”60 and those development plans that have been implemented have been in
private hands and shown little benefit to the local population. This has resulted in the
overall economic marginalization of the Sinai along with uneven development between
56
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the South, which has approximately 20% of the population but has received the majority
of development projects, and the North whose 80% of the population of the Peninsula has
been largely forgotten in terms of development. This has led to even higher levels of
resentment towards the central government and political and economic elites in Cairo.61
These developments have left many Sinai Bedouin with the impression that far
from being a part of the Egyptian nation after Israeli withdrawal, the Sinai is closer to
being the subject of an Egyptian colonialism that implements discriminatory policies that
firstly privilege outsiders from the Nile Valley and secondly use divide-and-rule tactics
by favoring the South in development projects.62 Many assert that no meaningful effort
has been made to integrate the Sinai’s population into greater Egypt. It seems more
accurate to say that the re-domestication of the Sinai following Israeli occupation, as has
been the case in earlier periods in its history, has been carried out along strategic
trajectories with concern for economic, political and security interests.
The tensions surrounding the Sinai’s place within the Egyptian nation-state
surfaced dramatically on a day in October 2004 when three bombs exploded in the South
Sinai coastal resorts of Taba, Ras Al-Shaytan and Nuweiba, killing thirty-four people.63
In the summer of 2005, an attack in Sharm el Sheikh killed seventy people, mostly
Egyptians.64 In 2006, the resort town of Dahab was hit by three more bombs, killing
nineteen.65 The government initially attributed the attacks to Al-Qaeda, but the alleged
connection to international terrorism was complicated by the timing of the three major
attacks on symbolic dates in Egyptian history66 and the high number of Egyptians in
comparison with Western tourists who were targeted.67 Thousands of “suspects” were
arrested in the aftermath of the attacks, most of them young men from North Sinai68 and
61
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responsibility was eventually attributed to a previously little-known Egyptian group
called Tawhid wa Jihad.69
In the period that followed the bombings, “[b]oth the state’s response and wider
public discussion [were] confined to the surface of events and … ignored the socioeconomic, cultural and political problems which are at the heart of Sinai’s disquiet.”70 In
light of decades of marginalization and underdevelopment of the Sinai, in addition to the
preferential treatment given to the South in development initiatives, there is “reason to
consider how the attacks may be linked to the question of Sinai and its population in
relation to the nation as a whole.”71
D. Sinai after Mubarak
On January 30th 2011, twelve days before President Mubarak’s resignation, residents of
the North Sinai town of Rafah called their relatives in Cairo to tell them that they had
“already finished the revolution” in the Sinai. This was in reference to the abrupt
withdrawal of security forces from the Peninsula the day before. Unlike most of the
Egyptians in Cairo who protested peacefully during the January 25th 2011 uprisings,
Bedouin protestors in the Sinai were armed from the outset. Attacks on police stations
and prisons in late January and early February 2011 led to the withdrawal of police and
state security forces and the release of prisoners, many of whom had been held since the
mass arrests of North Sinai men following terrorist attacks from 2004 to 2006.72 Many
Sinai Bedouin who felt they had lived as second-class citizens under the Mubarak regime
celebrated the withdrawal of the state and enjoyed freedom of movement for the first time
in decades.73
In the months that followed, the Peninsula saw continued violence with the
destruction of symbols and institutions of government, as well as increases in tribal
vendettas, hostage-taking and car-jacking.74 Arms trafficking through the Peninsula has
69
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come to incorporate a flow of weapons from Libya after the collapse of that country’s
government in August 2011.75 In August 2012, masked gunmen opened fire on an
Egyptian Army checkpoint near the Israeli border, killing fifteen soldiers.76 The
Egyptian government responded with Operation Eagle, which it said would be the largest
military mission since 1973, would find those responsible and would rid the Peninsula of
Islamist militants.77 In the weeks that followed, however, many said that while there was
an increase in military and police presence in the Sinai for the operation, military
statements were exaggerated and that little was actually being done.78
While anxieties surrounding the space of the Sinai seem to have intensified in
recent decades and particularly following the resignation of President Mubarak in 2011,
the Peninsula’s relationship to the Egyptian state has always been questioned and
challenged. While the new questions have arisen about the absence of the state, the
emergence of parallel systems of justice and even the potential emergence of a sub-state
entity, Sinai has always, to some degree, been self-governing. What is new is that the
narrative surrounding the Sinai has shifted from one that understands the space as
problematic, troublesome and challenging to one that sees it as lawless, chaotic and
ungovernable.
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III. Legal Geographies: Law and Other-Spaces
As the previous Chapter has demonstrated, the Sinai has played an important role in the
construction of the modern Egyptian nation-state. This relationship, however, has also
resulted in the construction of the Sinai as a semi-detached frontier zone that is outside,
separate and different from the rest of Egypt. This idea that the Sinai is an Other-space to
Egypt’s center has historically rendered it subject to processes of domestication through
law that often echoes and resembles the civilizing mission. This chapter explores the
relationship between law and Other-spaces using Antony Anghie’s concept, which he
calls “the dynamic of difference.”79 I then detail three techniques employed by the
Egyptian government, and to a lesser extent the Israeli government, through which the
space of the Sinai has been legally constructed as Other-space, paving the way for
exceptional regulation by law.
A. International Law and its Others
By entering into a discussion of the relationship between law and Other-spaces, I am
engaging with an ongoing critical project related to international law and its Others.80
Throughout history, international law has had many Others: women, culture, nature,
savages, barbarians, the colonial world and peripheral nations and peoples have all in
some way been the Other to of the Self of international law.81 These Others, as several
critical legal scholars have suggested, have played a crucial role in establishing the
identity of international law and in justifying its use. Critical legal scholars who have
engaged the question of international law and its Others have often identified the
continuities between colonialism and newer forms of imperialism in the twenty-first
century. They argue that international law was founded upon European imperialism and
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the exploitation of the non-European world and that international law continues to
reproduce these patterns of power, exploitation and exclusion.82
While some map these power imbalances squarely between the West and the
global South or between former colonial powers and their former colonies, others see the
Self and the Other, the inside and the outside of law as much harder to name in definite
terms. In this way, the power imbalances inherent in international law are produced and
reproduced in different forms through “the complicated and infinite process of
constituting the self in relation to the other through the institutions of law and
language.”83 Important in this analysis is the idea that the Other is not produced through
any specific formula or blueprint, but can be found on different scales and with different
actors. The patterns of domination and exclusion established by the colonial encounter
are reproduced, albeit in different forms, in other relationships such as the relationship
between a post-colonial state and its minorities,84 or between what some have called the
Transnational Capitalist Class and the Transnational Oppressed Classes.85
Antony Anghie argues that the relationship between international law and the
Other emerges in the perpetual efforts to create and bridge differences between that
which is universal or civilized and that which is particular or uncivilized.86 This driving
force of the civilizing mission is what Anghie calls the “dynamic of difference” and is
both endless and self-sustaining. It is this compelling invocation of the Other, Anghie
argues, that drives the creation of new doctrines of international law. But further
difference is also generated through these processes, rendering the task of bridging and
incorporating the Other endless because it is forever incomplete.87 As Anghie aptly
asserts, “each act of arrival reveals further horizons, each act of bridging further
differences that international law must seek to overcome.”88 In other words, law engages
in this continual effort to identify difference in order to sanction and correct it along
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juridical terms, resulting in what Foucault calls “the ever-to-be-accomplished unveiling
of the Same.”89 These confrontations in turn drive the creation and application of law in
a given context, reproducing patterns of domination and subordination.90
This dynamic is not a blueprint for the ways in which the civilizing mission
approaches difference, rather it is an ever shifting and adapting force that shapes law’s
interface with the Other. What becomes important to highlight here is that the Other
serves a crucial role in giving both purpose and justification to the law as it is animated in
the never-ending tasks of bridging and transforming. As Peter Fitzpatrick has argued, the
law needs this Other in order to reinforce its own identity and meaning.91 The narrative
of international law as having an inherently progressive value that leads humanity
towards a superior state of civilization and social development has held enormous sway
within the discipline.92 Contained in this idea of law as progress is not only a progression
of humanity towards the universalized and the civilized, but also a move away from the
particular, the uncivilized, and the Other.93 In this way, as Peter Fitzpatrick argues, the
identity of law is partially developed by the negation of what it is not, by the negation of
that which is Other.94 By constructing the identity of the Other as uncivilized, informal
and primitive, the identity of the law is mutually constructed as civilized, formal and
modern.
Anghie’s analysis pays particular attention to the role of the colonial encounter
and subsequent efforts at decolonization in the development and application of various
legal doctrines, particularly the central international legal doctrine of sovereignty.95 He
stresses, however, that “certain structures of thought regarding the ‘foreign’ or the
‘uncivilized,’ which arise from particular and identifiable historical circumstances, have
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an enduring presence”96 and that the dynamic of difference continues to operate in new
forms in the post-colonial state. Consequently, patterns of domination and subordination
“are often reproduced, albeit in somewhat modified form, in later encounters with people
deemed to be uncivilized and violent.”97
Following decolonization, “the achievement of development became the central
and defining preoccupation of the new states”98 and the post-colonial state was the agent
of that development. Wherever cultural divisions existed within a state, development was
seen as a means of transcending these divisions by representing the “universal interests”
of the national population and incorporating difference through the assimilation of
minorities into the “universal state.”99 The civilizing mission within the post-colonial
state justified “the intervention of the development state into the many social, economic
and cultural spheres that had been previously governed by the traditions of the particular
community involved.”100
The dynamic of difference becomes useful in understanding the historical context
of the Sinai and its relationship to the Egyptian state, and can be seen at many stages of
that history. Mehmet Ali’s Egypt provides a fitting example of the dynamic at work. In
the Pasha’s efforts to demonstrate control over his territory and borders through the
settling of tribes in Egypt, he encountered unique difficulties in the Sinai where
nomadism and the cross-border realities of the lives of Sinai tribes were seen as primitive
and ran contrary to the principles of the modern nation-state he was trying to establish.
In order to expand and solidify his rule in the Sinai, the Pasha attempted to bridge these
differences by developing elaborate bureaucracies to reach the tribes, to sanction unruly
behavior and to transform them into citizens accessible to the centralized state through
law.
The characteristics of the development state described by Anghie emerged most
forcefully in the Sinai under President Hosni Mubarak in the decades that followed the
return of the Peninsula from Israeli occupation. The National Project for the
Development of Sinai 1994-2017 sought to re-assert Egyptian control of the Peninsula’s
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resources and population through ambitious initiatives such as the settlement of Nile
Valley Egyptians in the Sinai, the creation of jobs for these settlers in tourism and
industries based on raw materials, and the full exploitation of the Peninsula’s natural
resources.101 The overall objective of the project, as stated by the Egyptian government,
was “the complete overhauling of the social, economic, political and culture [sic]
structure of Sinai,”102 a transformative effort that would be initiated and facilitated by
law.
B. Law and Other-Spaces
There is an inherent spatiality to Anghie’s theory as he describes the bridging of gaps that
exist between law and the Other in the crossing of what could be imagined as a physical
void between us and them. Anghie describes the “acts of arrival” and the revealing of yet
“further horizons” through the dynamic of difference creating an image of an endless
physical expansion and extension of the law as it reaches across space and territory to
bridge and overcome difference. Anghie contends that “it is primarily in the peripheries,
the non-sovereign, non-European world that sovereignty is completely unfettered,
directed and controlled only by its ingenuity in constructing the uncivilized in ever more
innovative ways which then call for new elaborations, applications and refinements in
sovereignty.”103
Throughout history, it is not just the populations and governments of the
peripheries that are the object of Anghie’s dynamic of difference; these relationships are
also spatialized and contained within Other-spaces such as the colonial territories, the
League of Nations mandate territories, so-called developing countries and, more recently
Rogue States and the Axis of Evil. While the population of the Sinai has often been the
object of efforts at domestication, integration and transformation through law, the space
of the Sinai has also been subject to exceptional legal regulation, creating particular legal
geographies within the Peninsula.

101

GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, 1994: THE NATIONAL PROJECT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINAI. 1994 - 2017.
Cited in Sarnowski supra note 56 at 83-84.
102
Id. at 84.
103
Anghie supra note 79 at 311.

26

C. Legal Geographies of the Sinai Peninsula
The Sinai, while of enormous economic and political importance, has also represented a
space of vulnerability in the modern Egyptian nation-state. Egypt’s eastern border
anxieties with Israel and Gaza have only intensified in light of regional security tensions
in recent decades and the Egyptian government has responded through the selective
domestication of the population, territory and resources. These efforts often come in the
name of security and in the form of law. In other words, the Sinai is not only imagined as
an Other, outside or vulnerable frontier space, it is also aggressively regulated as such
through law. In contrast to descriptions of the Sinai as a law-less region there is, in fact,
an abundance of law in the Peninsula. In considering the Sinai as a hyper-regulated
space, however, it must be noted that laws are not applied in a blanket but along specific
trajectories resulting in heavy regulation in some areas and none in others,104 according to
the strategic interests of the state.
The Sinai is regulated by several distinct but overlapping legal geographies. Like
other regions of the country, it is subject to general Egyptian law, to international laws
contained in international treaties signed by Egypt, and to customary international law.
Furthermore, the Sinai is exceptionally regulated by international and domestic laws that
apply exclusively to the Peninsula. At the international level the 1979 Peace Treaty
applies strictly to territory lying east of the isthmus of Suez and west of the border with
Gaza and Israel. The 1981 protocol to the treaty relating to the presence of Multinational
and Force Observer international peacekeepers, too, finds its application only on the
Peninsula. At the domestic level, the Sinai is regulated by a large body of additional
regulations related to security, land ownership, private property, development, resource
exploration and extraction, tourism, migration and border management.105 Egypt’s
decades-long emergency law has resulted in exceptional legislation and security measures
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in the country, many of which have been directed at the Sinai and its population.106
Additionally, Israel’s application of its anti-infiltration law has at times found its
application on the Peninsula as Israeli soldiers cross into Egyptian territory in order to
pre-emptively arrest those they believe intend to enter Israel illegally.107 Through these
overlapping legal geographies, the political, cultural, historical and legal relationships
between Egypt and its colonizers, between Egypt and Israel, between the Egyptian
government and its subjects, and between Nile Valley Egyptians and Sinai Bedouin are
mapped and layered onto the territory of the Sinai through law.108
This exceptional legal mapping is important because it demonstrates the ways in
which law’s efforts at sanctioning or transforming the Other through law apply not only
to people and populations, but also to space. To demonstrate this, I have chosen three
examples of the ways in which these legal geographies have operated in the Sinai as an
Other-space within the Egyptian state. First, the Sinai has been constructed as a
contested battleground in contrast with other regions of the country that sit securely
within Egyptian sovereignty. Second, the Sinai has been constructed as an empty space
in contrast to the densely populated and resource-scarce Nile Valley. Finally, the Sinai
has been constructed as a porous and dangerous frontier zone, a precarious periphery to
Egypt’s center.
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1. Sinai as a Battleground
The Sinai’s role in the region’s military history has led it to be called Egypt’s “eternal
battleground”109 and the Peninsula has absorbed and embodied many national and
regional tensions. On the one hand, the Peninsula represents a source of Egyptian
national pride resulting from the military victory that resulted in the return of the
Peninsula to Egypt following fifteen years of Israeli occupation. Regionally, many see the
re-taking of the Sinai as the last major Arab victory against Israel. Behind that victory,
however, lies the national embarrassment of having lost the Peninsula to Israel in the
1967 War in the first place. The memory of the Israeli occupation serves as a reminder
that the Sinai is a space of vulnerability for Egypt and that its status as Egyptian territory
is not fully assured. Nearly forty years after the end of hostilities between Egypt and
Israel, the image of the Sinai as a tenuous warzone remains.
While the Sinai has been an actual battlefield at many points in history, its legal
construction as such was intensified with the creation of Israel in 1948 and the ArabIsraeli Wars that followed. At the beginning of the 1948 War, Egyptian forces entered
the former British Mandate of Palestine through the Sinai and several battles took place
on the Peninsula when Israel entered its northeastern corner. Following the Arab defeat,
the 1949 Armistice Agreement situated the new state of Israel at the Sinai’s eastern edge,
with the exception of the Gaza Strip, over which the Egyptian government was made
temporary custodian and which it administered until 1967.110 The Sinai was seized by
Israel during the 1967 Six Day War, and remained under Israeli occupation until the last
settlements were withdrawn in 1982. During this fifteen-year period, the Peninsula was
subject to several overlapping regimes: some Egyptian laws still applied in the space,
some laws were implemented by Israeli occupying forces, and the Peninsula was further
regulated by the international laws of occupation contained in the 1907 Hague
Convention and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.111
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The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which officially returned the Peninsula to
Egypt and initiated Israeli withdrawal from the space, continues to intensively regulate
the Sinai. The Peace Treaty established “limited force zones,” that span the entire
Peninsula, from the Suez Canal to the Egypt-Israeli border, including a narrow strip of
Israeli territory. The four zones, labeled A through D, are distinguished by the varying
levels of Egyptian military, Egyptian police, Multinational Force Observers and Israeli
military presence permissible under the treaty.112 Zone A begins as soon as one crosses
the Suez Canal and enters the Sinai and each consecutive zone is characterized by
increasing regulation as one moves closer to the Egypt-Israel and Egypt-Gaza borders.
While very limited numbers of Egyptian troops are allowed in western and central
portions of the Peninsula, Zone C in far eastern Sinai is entirely demilitarized. The zone
continues to be patrolled by roughly 1,600 Multinational Force Observers (MFO) who
were given a role in the supervision and implementation of the security provisions of the
treaty in the treaty’s Annex I and in an additional protocol negotiated in 1981.113
The legacy of the Sinai as a battlefield and a military buffer continues to shape
Egypt’s politico-legal and military approaches to the Peninsula and to its population. As
I discussed in Chapter II, despite the fact that the Sinai was returned to Egyptian control
more than thirty years ago, suspicions remain as to the loyalties of its inhabitants, a
population that was occupied by the enemy for fifteen years.114 Many laws and policies
that have been applied to the Sinai in recent decades evidence these questioned loyalties
in nuanced ways and have blatantly marginalizing effects.
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A striking example of this marginalization can be found in the legacy of
restrictive land ownership laws in the Peninsula. Law 143 of 1981, known as the Desert
Lands Law,115 which applies to all Egyptian land two kilometers outside of city limits,
holds enormous implications for land ownership in the Sinai. The law considers wad alyad, which literally means “to put hands on” and refers to de facto ownership of land
without official documents, to be in violation of state property.116 This means that the
state does not recognize land ownership in many places the Sinai, where property may be
passed down for generations according to customary law but in the absence of official
documents. Anyone found to be illegally occupying state lands may face imprisonment,
fines and land seizure.117 Particularly relevant to the Sinai is the fact that the law
prohibits all land ownership in strategic military areas, which are defined by the Minister
of Defense.118 Law 632 of 1982 expands upon the 1981 law with stipulations specific to
four areas of the country, including the Sinai.119 This law allows for private ownership of
desert lands in some cases where the land has been farmed for more than three years, but
requires the person hoping to claim the rights to their property to go through a lengthy
and complicated process that involves submitting proof of ownership, maps and
blueprints to a government committee.120 Even if the application is approved, the
Minister of Defense may override the decision should he decide to designate the land in
question as part of a strategic military area.121
In the absence of official ownership in the eyes of the state, local populations
have continued to follow customary procedures for property ownership contained in
Bedouin law. In sharp contrast to the restrictions placed on Sinai inhabitants with regards
to land ownership, however, the Tourism and Development Authority encouraged private
sector investment in tourism in the 1990s by offering reclaimed land in South Sinai for
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purchase at $1.00 USD per square meter.122 The market was transformed and many
locals were stripped of ownership rights in the name of development.123
The 2012 Law for the Comprehensive Development of the Sinai Peninsula
contains an article that opens up government-sanctioned land ownership to Sinai
inhabitants, but requires proof of the sole Egyptian nationality of the buyer and of his or
her parents.124 The wording of the law is unclear with regards to implications for
inheritance, but has left many dual nationals, foreign nationals married to Egyptians and
individuals whose parents hold another nationality anxious about the future consequences
of the law.125 Later in 2012, the Minister of Defense invoked his power under Law 143
of 1981 and prohibited all land ownership within five kilometers of the North Sinai
border with Gaza and Israel, an area inhabited by approximately 10,000 families.126
In another example of marginalizing policies in the name of military concerns in
the Peninsula, young men native to the Sinai, particularly Bedouins and those whose
families are from the city of el Arish, are drafted into the military at much lower rates
than the rest of the population. Those who are drafted are typically put into low-stakes
positions, outside of the Sinai and far from strategic and security concerns. While it is
not an official rule, it is generally known that Bedouins are not accepted into Egyptian
Police and Military Academies and are excluded from high-ranking police and military
positions. Considering that these are some of the most secure and respected jobs
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available and in light of the high rates of unemployment—particularly youth
unemployment— in the country,127 these exclusions come at a great cost.
2. Sinai as Empty Space
“We have known four periods of occupation [ihtilal]: British, Egyptian, Israeli and, for
the last 30 years, Egyptian again. Look, there they are, the colonialists of today.”128
The notion of empty territory, or terra nullius, has played an important role in the
processes of legal legitimation of conquest and the movement of colonial settler
populations into colonized spaces. In order to justify the claiming of space already
inhabited by indigenous societies, land is often rendered as vacant, uninhabited, or empty.
The legal category of terra nullius has lost its relevance as the imagined “white spaces on
the map”129 have been divided up and claimed by colonial powers. There remains at the
level of the imagination, however, “a persistent longing for a yet unknown and unclaimed
frontier, a terra nullius… a nostalgic longing for a virgin territory … as yet unmapped,
still awaiting the cartographer’s pen and the explorer’s gaze.”130
Since the return of the Sinai to Egyptian control following the end of Israeli
occupation, the Peninsula has not only been seen as empty space to be claimed, it has also
been legally constructed as such. This was particularly evident in Egyptian laws and
government policies in the early 1980s promoting the settlement of Nile Valley migrants
in the Sinai. From 1982 onwards, following the dismantling of the last remaining Israeli
settlements from the Peninsula, the Mubarak regime sought to integrate and control the
Sinai through encouraging large numbers of migrants from the Nile Valley to settle in the
Sinai. As I discussed in Chapter II, the National Project for the Development of Sinai
1994-2017 aimed to provide for the settlement of millions of Egyptians from the Nile
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Valley in the Sinai, and to create hundreds of thousands of jobs for these migrants. In
contrast to the Nile Valley, an overpopulated space of increasing scarcity, the Sinai was
seen as an empty space of opportunity into which these migrants could be settled, and be
absorbed by the tourism industry in the Peninsula as laborers. Notably, the government
plan does not mention the Bedouin population in its section on “objectives, mainstays and
potentials.”131 The report states instead that “[the] Sinai is a model of national pioneer
development in which new and unconventional policies of building new societies are
implemented,”132 implying a lack of existing “societies” within the space.
Large swaths of the Sinai are composed of sparsely inhabited desert and harsh
mountain terrain, but portions of the northern industrial areas are relatively heavily
populated and the rest of the Peninsula is far from empty or uninhabited.133 Nonetheless,
Egyptian laws and policies have often treated the space of the Sinai as vacant and
uninhabited, ignoring the well-established structure of property rights contained in
Bedouin customary law and paving the way for colonial policies of land, resource and
contract allocation. As I discussed in Chapter II, Nile Valley migrants brought to work in
Sinai industries are given preferential treatment in employment and housing upon arrival,
resulting in systematic discrimination against local populations. In the resort town of
Sharm el Sheikh, for example, all building plots were allocated to Egyptian and foreign
companies investing in tourism and the vast majority of the tens of thousands of jobs
created in the city went to non-locals.134 In North Sinai, too, Cairo businesspeople
control much of the industrial sector, employing primarily Nile Valley workers and
providing little benefit to local populations.135
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3. Sinai as a Border
Egypt’s eastern border in the Sinai has long been a source of anxiety and vulnerability for
the state and has been regulated and securitized in ways that distinguish it from Egypt’s
southern and western borders.136 The reach of the state in the Sinai is limited by the
transnational nature of the lives of many of the Peninsula’s inhabitants, characterized as
they are by economic and familial ties across Egypt’s the eastern border. These
relationships, as I discussed in Chapter II, have contributed to questions about the
national loyalties of Sinai residents. In addition to national concerns, Egypt receives
pressure from the Israeli government to control the movement of arms, militants and
migrants across the Gaza and Israel borders. Furthermore, Egyptian border guards have
been known to enact shoot-to-kill policies at the Israeli border, using lethal force against
individuals –particularly African migrants— leaving Egypt to cross into Israel.137
These concerns, however, are not limited to the actual border. While Egypt’s
border with Israel and Gaza appears as a line on the map, the Sinai itself has been legally
constructed as an extended border that spans the entire Peninsula, extending the
application of the types of laws and policies typically seen at national borders. It is not
unusual for a border, particularly a militarized border, to have a zone on either side in
which individual access and economic activity are restricted or forbidden altogether.
These zones, however, are rarely more than a few kilometers wide, are generally
uninhabited and are deemed to be outside the normal operations of the state.138 The
Sinai, on the other hand, a Peninsula of more than 61,000 square kilometers, is nearly
twice the size of Egypt’s Nile Valley, three times the size of Israel, 200 times the size of
Gaza and contains two of Egypt’s governorates.139 Nonetheless, through the exceptional
security measures related to land ownership and the movement of goods and individuals,
the entire Peninsula has been constructed and treated as an extended zonal border.
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The movement of goods and individuals through the Sinai is heavily regulated
through the presence of both military and police checkpoints. While it is not unusual to
find an occasional security checkpoint on roads in other parts of Egypt, the number of
checkpoints on roads through the Sinai far exceeds those found in other governorates.
When entering the Sinai at the Suez or Port Said crossings, individuals and vehicles are
stopped at military checkpoints and must pass through procedures similar to an
international border crossing. All individuals are required to present their identification
and foreign nationals must show visas or proof of residency. Individuals are questioned
as to their reasons for travel to or through the Peninsula and drivers of commercial
vehicles are required to provide documentation for their cargo and to allow military
officials to search their vehicles for prohibited goods. These border-like procedures are
often repeated at additional military and police checkpoints across the Peninsula.
Each of the above examples—the Sinai as a battleground, as empty space and as
an extended border—constructs the Peninsula as an Other-space that is distinct and
different from the rest of Egypt. Just as law seeks to bridge the differences between us
and them through efforts at sanctioning and transforming individuals and populations, a
similar approach is taken to Other-spaces. Through the identification of the various types
of Otherness embodied by the Sinai, law becomes both animated and justified: as a
tenuous battleground, the Sinai must be protected from the enemy and from those
disloyal to the nation-state; as an empty space it must be filled and settled, its resources
plundered; as an extended border, it must be exceptionally regulated and securitized.
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IV. Imaginative Geographies: Mapping the Outlaw
“This mattered, I realized then, because representations are never merely mirrors held
up to the world; they enter fully into its formation.”140
On a street in downtown Cairo in late 2011, a wall covered in freshly painted graffiti
addressed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forced (SCAF), the military body ruling
Egypt at the time: “You act like lions in the Square but you act like women in the Sinai!”
In nearby Tahrir Square, a group of protesters called on Egypt’s military rulers to transfer
power to a civilian body, echoing the message painted on the wall, “If you are strong, go
back to the border and show us your strength there!” and “Why are you here in the
Square? In the Sinai, the enemy will have free reign.”
Through these chants the Egyptian protesters called on the military to stay out of
politics and to restrict their role to that of national security, while simultaneously
criticizing them for failing to exercise effective control over the Sinai during their rule.
But there is also a spatial narrative –not to mention a gendered narrative— in these
statements and demands; Tahrir Square is rendered as a space of politics whereas the
Sinai is constructed as the space of “real” danger where military force is both necessary
and legitimate. Tahrir Square is imagined as the space where the Egyptian people engage
in protests and political negotiation with the Egyptian government, whereas the Sinai is
the place where the unnamed enemy141 lurks and must be confronted. Cairo is imagined
as the center, the heart of the country where internal issues are named and negotiated
whereas the Sinai is conversely imagined as an exterior space which, if not effectively
policed, will render the entire country vulnerable to the enemy.
As I have argued in the previous chapters and as reflected in the spatial narrative
above, the Sinai has been constructed as an Other-space that is somehow outside and
separate from the Egyptian state, while still inside its borders and a part of its national
territory. This characterization has come about from a number of converging points
related to the geostrategic location of the Peninsula, its role in regional military history,
its economic value, and tensions associated with its population, whose “Egyptian-ness”
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and loyalties to the state have often been questioned. As such, the Egyptian government
has at times approached the Sinai and its population through strategic efforts at
domestication and national integration through law. In this way, the dynamic of
difference described by Anghie is an appropriate mode of analysis for much of Egypt’s
approach to the Sinai, which has been constructed as an Other-space to be bridged,
transformed and brought inside the Egyptian nation-state through law.
There is a different tone, however, to the understanding of the space of the Sinai
contained in the chants coming from Tahrir. The national narrative surrounding the Sinai
no longer includes discussions of reclaiming, of national affirmation, of settlement or of
integration—and not because the Egyptian state has achieved assimilation and unification
of the Sinai with the rest of Egypt more than thirty years after its return from Israeli
control. To the contrary, the integrity and identity of Egypt’s eastern border zone is
perhaps less assured than it has been in decades. As the chants and graffiti indicate, the
Sinai is seen as a space in which the actions of the state are shaped by geostrategic and
security concerns and in which efforts are thus focused on containing and controlling the
Peninsula, rather than transforming it.
A. Imaginative Geographies
The narrative of the Sinai that emerged from Tahrir Square during anti-SCAF protests in
2011 imagines a particular geography of the Egyptian nation-state and the ways in which
that space may be divided, labeled and understood. The term “imaginative geography”
was first used by Edward Said in his critical discussions of Orientalism to describe the
universal though often arbitrary “practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space
which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs.’”142 Said argues
that while these geographic divisions between our space and their space may not be
entirely fictional, they are less a fact of nature than of human production.143 As Derek
Gregory further elaborates, “[w]e might think of imaginative geographies as fabrications,
a word that usefully combines ‘something fictionalized’ and ‘something made real,’
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because they are imaginations given substance.”144 But imaginative geographies not only
demonstrate the space that is ours and the space that is theirs, they also describe them as
having particular characteristics. Additional meanings are invested at many other levels,
designating spaces of safety and spaces of danger, spaces of wealth and spaces of
poverty, spaces of weakness and spaces of power.
Increasingly, these spatial imaginations are converted into indexes, maps and
online info-graphics. The Democracy Index,145 the Poverty Index,146 and even the
Happiness Index147 are accompanied by colorful maps that divide, categorize and display
various spaces in order to tell us where and to what extent these defining characteristics
can be found. The Failed State Index148 provides a telling example of the ways in which
spaces that are imagined as chaotic and lawless mapped. The Index lists 177 states and
ranks them from most failed to least failed, from Somalia to Finland.149
The Failed State Index’s interactive website does not provide a definition of a failed
state,150 but rather gives each state a score of failed state-ness, calculated according to
various political, social, economic and security criteria.151
In order to give the reader a visual understanding of state failure around the globe,
the Failed State Index displays a map of the world, colored by country in “critical” red,
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“in danger” orange, “borderline” yellow, “stable” chartreuse, and “most stable,” a
coveted green. At the center of the map, Africa has been largely red-washed, the crimson
seeping into most of the Middle East and Central Asia, while the bulk of the Asian land
mass is colored “in danger” orange. The Americas are a mixed batch spanning the
spectrum from “critical” Bolivia, Colombia and Haiti to “most stable” Canada
slumbering in the north. By clicking on a country on the Failed State map the viewer can
see its score and rank alongside arrows indicating whether the state has moved up or
down on the list in the past year.152 A Watch List is also provided to warn the viewer of
those states whose stability is deteriorating as they are imagined to be slipping towards
the edge of failure.153
While no new official borders are drawn on the map, the color-coding of countries
according to their failed state-ness employs Said’s imaginative geographies creating
meaningful new boundaries and new divides, and reconfiguring the way we imagine
space on the global scale. In this case it is not just our space and their space, but also
normalcy and emergency that are separated along geographic lines.154 The map
confidently displays where in the world there is safety and where there is danger, where
we will find stability and where we should expect to encounter violence and disorder.
The map tells us which states are failed and which states may be sliding towards an
imaginary cliff of chaos and collapse. It also tells us, crucially, which states are notfailed, sitting securely in dark green stability. It tells us which places are not dangerous
and not a risk for us, whether for adventure or investment.
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While the particular spatial reading of the Failed State Index has chosen the state
as its site of analysis the same processes and methods of mapping could be applied to a
region within a given state, an entire city, a neighborhood within a city or any number of
other spaces as sites of failure. In the case of Egypt and the Sinai, we can see this sort of
mapping operating on several scales. If the protesters in Tahrir Square map the Sinai
bright red as the “real” space of danger, this would be contrasted with the friendlier
chartreuse that might color the Egyptian territory west of Suez. In times of violent
unrest, on the other hand, Tahrir Square, the Presidential Palace, Port Said and a number
of other spaces within mainland Egypt may turn orange or red. In military terms, the
Sinai would be internally color-mapped according to the zones set out by the 1979 Peace
Treaty, resulting in a rainbow-like spectrum beginning with a “borderline” yellow at the
Suez Canal and becoming more and more red as one moves east across the Peninsula,
approaching Egypt’s border with Gaza and Israel.
For holidaymakers and for Egypt’s Tourism Authority, the Sinai would be
mapped in yet another manner, one that distinguishes the Red Sea coastal resort areas of
South Sinai from the center and northern regions of the Peninsula. The Red Sea coastal
resort area might be mapped as a “fairly stable” green, a space of pleasure and leisure for
wealthy Egyptians and foreigners visiting from abroad. This swath of safety would be
centered at Sharm el Sheikh, moving along the coast in both directions, enveloping
several smaller resort towns such as Dahab, Nuweiba, Taba and Ras Sidr and the string of
gated beach condo communities in between. Those wishing to visit Egypt’s Red Sea in
the Sinai are advised to arrive to their coastal paradise by plane, flying over and thus
avoiding the risky and shadowy portions of the Peninsula that are mapped in an orangered hue of unpredictability. This coastal green-zone is disrupted, of course, by the
occasional kidnapping of a foreign tourist or by a bomb set off in a seaside restaurant, but
these are seen as mere aberrations demonstrating the need for better policing of the
boundaries between zones of safety and zones of danger. Following the 2005 bombing at
the tourist market in Sharm el Sheikh, government officials initiated the construction of a
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1.5-meter high fence around the resort city155 which, had it been built,156 would have
been a physical manifestation of already imagined boundaries between the two spaces.
While this sort of mapping can be used to display the presence or absence of any
number of elusive characteristics of a place – such as democracy, poverty or happinessthere is an added level of significance when it is applied to the Sinai and other spaces that
are zoned as lawless, dangerous or chaotic. Zoning, according to Guillermina Seri, is
“the distinction between spaces of safety and spaces of lawlessness and exception.”157
“Normal” spaces under this model are characterized by the preeminence of the rule of
law, as contrasted with zones of exception in which the juridical order has been
suspended.158 Within Seri’s zones of exception, “different sorts of signs, languages, lives,
identities and forms of production coexist without any recognizable pattern other than
crisis and corruption. Anything may take place in these zones, and does take place in
them.”159
Seri argues that zoning has been the primary activity of sovereign power since its
origin.
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By zoning and dividing up space, the sovereign exercises its power to

determine which zones will be designated as normal spaces and which will be labeled as
zones of exception. In this sense, the act of defining and contrasting normal and
exceptional spaces represents the decision through which the sovereign can both frame
and stabilize its power. Applying Giorgio Agamben to the processes of dividing, carving
up and labeling space, we see that the identification of places that are deemed to be
lacking rule of law serve the purpose of making more visible and emphasizing the
importance and stability of those spaces where the rule of law is present.161 These spaces
are not merely Other-spaces that present a challenge or a task for law, but often appear to
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elude or resist such transformative processes altogether, requiring and justifying other
approaches that may instead aim to contain, control or simply ignore them. These spaces
are seen as threatening and dangerous and are mapped not only as Other, but also as
outside and as Outlaw.
B. Mapping Outlaw Space
The notion of Outlaw space proposed here is not intended as a blueprint or formula,
though it may be a useful as a way to connect the Sinai with the other spaces I mentioned
in the introduction of this thesis, the no man’s lands, the black holes, the security
vacuums and the breeding grounds that seem to have proliferated in the post-9/11 era.
My goal is to bring to light certain patterns in the relationships of power in these spaces
that are often characterized as chaotic, ungovernable or lawless when the realities of what
is happening within those spaces and how they came to be that way is much more
complex.
The choice of the term Outlaw space is not an attempt to engage the imagery of
the romanticized cowboy wanderer or the fugitive bank-robber and gunfighter of the
American West, though this fantasy figure has been invoked more than once in the case
of the Sinai.162 The Outlaw in its human form, it is worth noting, is understood as having
crossed a line and entered into the space outside the law, at which point the prosecutor is
released from his duties. Efforts at transformation through law that would be applied to
the criminal or to the uncivilized subject are then abandoned. This is not to say that he is
forgotten about. When an individual exists on the “wrong” side of this line, he is also
outside of the sphere of legal protection and subject to whatever fate or punishment
should befall him.163 Additional measures may be taken against the Outlaw in order to
control his actions or to contain the damage the he may cause. In yet other cases, just so
long as he does not cause too many problems, the Outlaw may also be ignored. Outlaw
space, too, is seen as existing outside the law. Contrary to the imagination of these
spaces as lawless, however, law is still present but works in strategic ways and along
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specific trajectories that aim not necessarily to sanction and transform, but sometimes to
simply contain, control, exploit or ignore.
I have also chosen the term Outlaw space for its application in the more literal
sense: that which is outside of the law, as opposed to that which is in-law, or inside the
realm of the law. This basic juxtaposition, as I will elaborate further in this section, is
complicated by the presence—even the superabundance— of law in Outlaw spaces but it
remains essential to the value of these spaces in processes of mutual construction and the
exercise of power through the zoning, dividing and labeling of space. In distinguishing
between the out and the in of law in spatial terms, lines and boundaries are drawn around
spaces in an attempt to define and give a certain territoriality to that which is Outlaw.
The Sinai as an Outlaw space is easily imagined and labeled according to its relatively
self-contained geographic nature as a Peninsula but in reality, there is nothing natural
about these spaces and it is not always clear where they begin and where they end.
Outlaw space has much to do with a particular imagination of space as dangerous
and threatening but that space is not Outlaw according to any inherent or pre-defined
characteristics. In fact, the characteristics of Outlaw space itself are often secondary to
the ways in which it is imagined and constructed through law. Referring back to the
quote with which I began this Chapter, representations of a space are never merely
mirrors or descriptions of existing realities but may enter into the fabrication of those
spaces. In this way, Outlaw space is performative in that “it produces the effects that it
names.”164 This is not to say that Outlaw spaces are mere fantasies. These spaces may
very well be dangerous and difficult to control but by imagining them as lawless, we are
precluded from seeing the ways in which law is present, and may indeed contribute to the
precariousness of the space. By understanding these spaces as ungovernable, we cannot
see that they are often governed in very specific and strategic ways. By imagining them
as black holes or vacuums we are unable to see the presence of normalcy and order that
exist within these spaces and the ways in which people continue to live their lives facing
challenges that, on many levels, resemble those faced by people in “normal” spaces.
John Marx notes this normality in his comments on Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s novel
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Half of a Yellow Sun,165 in which the author gives an account of the Nigerian crisis that
culminated in the Biafrian War. Marx observes that,
couples fall in and out of love, families mourn, and children grow up in
communities displaced and devastated by conflict. People starve and die
in the refugee camp where the novel’s final chapters are set, but they also
write poetry, have sex, and engage in intellectual debate…166
This portrayal of life in what was seen by the world as an Outlaw space “suggests
that what goes on in the most unstable of states is never so extreme that it cannot
be normed.”167
Outlaw spaces are important because they serve particular purposes. First of all,
the processes that produce Outlaw spaces simultaneously co-produce spaces that are inlaw. This reinforces characteristics of in-law spaces that are imagined to be linked to the
the presence of law, safety and order. If we return to Fitzpatrick’s argument that the
identity of law itself is constructed through the negation of that which is not-law, the
identity of in-law spaces, too, are constructed in opposition to spaces that are Outlaw. In
creating boundaries that illustrate the presence of Outlaw spaces, “law itself becomes
formed in ways that secure its integrity.”168 These divisions between in-law and Outlaw
are produced not only through the drawing of new lines, but also by re-imagining,
moving, removing, fragmenting or differentiating existing boundaries.169 Law is thus
imagined to have collapsed or deteriorated in Outlaw spaces while maintaining its
integrity in places that are in-law. In this way, drawing attention to the failure and
collapse in the Sinai may serve to distract or draw attention away from, for example,
Egypt’s failing economy and deep unrest in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt’s center.
Outlaw spaces, then, serve the purpose of assigning a territoriality to our anxieties in
order to locate it in spaces that are elsewhere.
Secondly, Outlaw spaces serve the purpose of justifying the exceptional behavior
of the state, behavior that would otherwise be seen as unacceptable in in-law spaces. In
the Sinai, rounding up and jailing hundreds of men from cities in the north following the
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explosion of a bomb across the border in Israel is more easily justified if the space is
zoned as a breeding ground for terrorism. In Rio, a pre-dawn operation in which a fleet
of 1,500 police and navy commandos backed by armored vehicles occupy a
neighborhood in Rio is more easily justified if that neighborhood is a zoned as a lawless
slum run by drug lords.170 It becomes yet more acceptable in light of the upcoming
Olympic Games in the Rio, around which walls –real or imagined—of law, order and
security are built. Once Rogue States are zoned as such, those who are suspected to of
possessing or to intending to develop weapons of mass destruction become the subject of
a “legitimate” attack.171
Thirdly, zoning a space as Outlaw allows for certain strategic and selective uses
of law in the space to the exclusion of others. In spaces like the Sinai, this means that the
state can still access the oil, gas and other natural resources of the Peninsula remaining
indifferent to the torture, rape and extortion faced by kidnapped migrants on the
Peninsula.172 Furthermore, this zoning facilitates the state in its active economic
underdevelopment of the Sinai as it funnels natural resources and their profits out of the
Peninsula. By constructing the Sinai as an Outlaw space, the state can then explain the
poverty that results from this underdevelopment as resulting from the so-called deviant,
lawless or chaotic behavior of the population of the Sinai as opposed to acknowledging
the ways in which this behavior may be partially caused by poverty and marginalization.
For example, in early 2012 a group of Bedouin activists held a sit-in in the south Sinai
town of Wadi Feiran to ask the government for running water in their homes and
development projects to ease unemployment in the town.173 When they received no
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acknowledgement from the government, the group decided to detain two busloads of
European tourists visiting a nearby monastery.174 The tourists were released unharmed
after five hours but not before the governor’s security chief, panicked over potential
effects on already low levels of international tourism, agreed to meet with the group.175
A few days later, members of the same tribe kidnapped two Americans and their
Egyptian guide in the same area, this time in an effort to win the release of relatives they
felt had been jailed unfairly.176 In both situations, the kidnappings came in an effort to be
heard by the government in a region where the population has often been ignored.
C. Beyond Defensive Imperialism: Containing and Controlling Outlaw Space
The Sinai has been constructed as Other-space– namely a battleground, an empty space
and a border zone—but it has also been constructed as Outlaw space. Outlaw space
differs from Other-space in that the Otherness in question is deemed to be somehow
dangerous or threatening. Anghie’s theory portrays a similar confrontation with a
dangerous and threatening Other as he discusses the most recent manifestation of the
dynamic of difference as seen in the War against Terrorism following the attacks of
September 11th, 2001. Anghie argues that contemporary imperialism has shifted its
motives and strategies in order to confront this dangerous and threatening Other, namely,
the terrorist.177
The War against Terrorism, Anghie points out, continues the goals of the
civilizing mission but with an important shift: rather than seeking to achieve the salvation
of “backward” or “uncivilized” peoples, this newer form of imperialism –which Anghie
calls “imperialism as self-defense”- is concerned instead with ensuring the safety of the
American people.178 According to the thinking of the War against Terrorism, this task
must be accomplished by using pre-emptive self-defense (PESD) against the Rogue State
in order to transform its society through democracy promotion initiatives.179 Anghie
argues that in the post-9/11 era, the task of transforming the Other “has acquired an
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unprecedented urgency, an imperative character, precisely because it is now so
powerfully linked to the idea of self-defence and survival, not only of the United States
but of civilization itself.”180
Anghie’s theory, however, fails to fully capture the Egyptian state’s approach to
the Sinai because it still implies an ambition or an intention to transform the Other
through law. In the Sinai this has not necessarily been the case. Where the Egyptian
government once hailed the reclaiming of the Peninsula as an opportunity for reintegration and national affirmation, the space of the Sinai has increasingly been cast
outside and excluded. Where the state once sought to transform the Peninsula through
ambitious development efforts that would result in “the complete overhauling of the
social, economic, political and culture [sic] structure”181 of the Peninsula, these efforts
have been largely abandoned. The question remains, then, as to what happens if the acts
of bridging described in the dynamic of difference become impossible or when subjects
and spaces slip from the grasp of the law, resisting or eluding the attempts at integration
and transformation. What happens if the moment of arrival described by Anghie is
interrupted or never transpires? Or, perhaps more importantly, what happens when this
process of bridging to Other-space through law is not seen as being in the interest of the
state or of the world and previous efforts are abandoned?
Instead of efforts at transformation along juridical lines, the Egyptian state has
come to favor an approach that partially or fully abandons the civilizing mission and
instead aims to merely contain and control the space of the Sinai. In a performance of
space that assigns territoriality to the anxieties of the Egyptian state and other actors in
the region, the Sinai is seen as a potential breeding ground for Islamic extremism. But
while some voices call for this threat to be addressed or neutralized, others see
containment as a higher priority and raise a red flag when this extremist threat spills over,
the bounds of the Peninsula, threatening shift or expand to other provinces.182 The threat
associated with the Peninsula, according to the Egyptian government, must be contained
within that space.
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In the case of the group of Bedouin activists in Wadi Feiran, the state ignored
initial demands from the sit-in but was forced to respond when reports of the kidnapping
of foreign tourists reached the international media. They diffused the situation by
promising a meeting with a government official if the tourists were released. Media
reports do not mention whether or not the demands for running water in the homes of the
townspeople and projects to ease unemployment were addressed by the state but a
meaningful government response is unlikely given the history of marginalization on the
Peninsula. Reports do indicate, however, that none of the relatives of the kidnappers who
were in prison were released, nor were any of the kidnappers arrested.183 The concern of
the state in this case is neither to resolve the issue by agreeing to the terms of the
activists, nor is it to sanction and punish the kidnappers through law. By agreeing to a
meeting with the activists, the state was able to contain and control the immediate
situation and to re-draw the lines between the safe spaces of tourism and the shadowy
spaces of danger within the Peninsula but pursued it no further once the tourists were
released. The concern of the state, then, is not to correct or transform the space but rather
to contain and control the space to the extent that it can ensure that its inhabitants do not
kidnap tourists for too long, blow up too many pipelines, or let too many migrants into
Israel, or cause too much disruption to access to the Peninsula’s natural resources.
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V.

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to shed light on the relationship between the Egyptian state and the
Sinai Peninsula in a way that draws connections to a broader global narrative of chaotic,
lawless and ungovernable spaces that has proliferated in the post 9/11 era, but that also
seeks to disrupt and move beyond that narrative. I have argued that by way of
imaginative and legal geographies, the Sinai has been constructed as an outside and
Other-space long before it entered the international spotlight following the 2011 Egyptian
uprisings. Rather than creating a rupture in the relationship between Egypt and the Sinai,
the withdrawal of the security apparatus in the early months of 2011 only brought to light
and intensified dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that had been at play since the
formation of the modern Egyptian nation-state and perhaps before.
At the same, there has been a subtle shift in the relationship between the Sinai and
Egypt in recent decades, one that, this thesis proposes, is indicative of a larger shift in the
relationship between law and space, between the nation-state and territory. This shift has
led to the construction of the Sinai—and places beyond the Sinai—not only as Otherspaces, but also as Outlaw spaces. Mapping and labeling certain zones as outside the law
is deceptive. There is nothing natural about Outlaw spaces and it is not always clear
where they begin and where they end. While Outlaw spaces are imagined as law-less,
law may still be present –even abundant—in the space but works in strategic ways and
along specific trajectories.
Whether Outlaw spaces are dangerous, lawless, chaotic or not, the drawing of
boundaries and labeling of the spaces they demarcate amounts to a forceful exercise of
power and has important implications for the ways in which the space will be regulated,
not regulated or selectively regulated through law. Zoning a space as Outlaw not only
creates truths about that space, it also seeks to provide an explanation for the nature of
these spaces and in doing so, asserts the opposite qualities of in-law spaces that are
constructed at the same time. These processes of mapping, zoning, dividing and labeling
of space are not just a tool for the use or non-use of law within a space, they also seek to
provide a narrative for why the imperial eye of law has failed in its efforts to infinitely
extend its reach to sanction and transform the Other.
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Antony Anghie’s theory on the relationship between international law and the
Other, as expressed through the dynamic of difference, is useful in understanding some of
the ways in which the Egyptian state has attempted to transform the space of the Sinai
through law. The theory, however, fails to fully explain the use of power in Outlaw
spaces because it assumes that there is always an ambition and an intention to bridge the
void between us and them, and to transform the Other through law. As I have
demonstrated in the case of the Sinai, this is not always the case. As Outlaw space, the
Sinai is not just constructed and located as outside, it is in many ways cast outside into a
space that is actively defiled.184 A space that is defiled will not necessarily be sanctioned,
transformed or rebuilt, it may instead be simply contained, controlled, exploited or
ignored.
By examining the force of both legal and imaginative geographies in the context
of the Sinai, I have attempted to highlight broader dynamics of power that may be useful
in understanding spaces beyond the Sinai, such as the “black holes,” the “breeding
grounds,” the “security vacuums” and the “no man’s lands” that have proliferated in the
post-9/11 era. By going beyond these opportunistic labels, we may be able to better
identify patterns in where we find the Outlaw, in how the lines are drawn between in-law
and Outlaw, and in the functions that these spaces serve to those spaces that are
constructed in their negation. A spatial analysis of this sort enables us to better see the
links between state policies toward a population within a given space as they relate to the
presence and desirability of natural resources within that space. Furthermore, it allows us
to see the powerful meaning invested in Outlaw spaces, the important consequences for
the people who live in or pass through that space and the ways in which, as Anghie would
say, the Sinai Bedouin is connected to the Iraqi and the Native American, along with the
inhabitants of any number of Outlaw spaces, all of whom have been seen as threats to
security and who “challenge [a] system of government that is extended to incorporate
them.”185 But beyond this, it enables us to also see the situations in which those subjects
slip from the grasp of the law at the same time as efforts at extending, bridging and
transforming are partially or fully abandoned in favor of containment and control.
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Finally, to return to my starting point, a theory of Outlaw space may give us a way of
understanding the “hundreds of bodies” of Eritrean migrants as resulting from much more
than just a vacuum of unfortunate lawlessness, chaos and violence.
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